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Abstract 
 
According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks are to be managed by Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), consisting of coastal states and 
relevant Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs).    In the North East Atlantic 
there are several straddling stocks, including herring, mackerel, blue whiting, 
redfish and numerous deep sea stocks that are exploited both within coastal 
states’ 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones and on the high seas.  Management 
of such stocks poses special management problems. In this area, the North East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) represents the relevant RFMO.  So far the 
literature has devoted little attention to RFMOs in general and to NEAFC in 
particular.  The purpose of this report is, first, to provide an overview of the 
organisation, structure, and objectives of NEAFC and, second, to consider its 
performance with regard to resource management.  
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0.   BACKGROUND 
According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks are to be managed by Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) [1],  consisting of coastal states 
and relevant Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs).    In the North East Atlantic 
there are several straddling stocks, including herring, mackerel, blue whiting, 
redfish and numerous deep sea stocks that are exploited both within coastal 
states’ 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones and on the high seas.  Management 
of such stocks poses special management problems.  
 
In this area, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) represents 
the relevant RFMO.  So far the literature has devoted little attention to RFMOs in 
general and to NEAFC in particular.  The purpose of this report is, first, to 
provide an overview of the organisation, structure, and objectives of NEAFC and, 
second, to consider its performance with regard to resource management.  
 
The report is organised as follows: Section 1 describes the establishment, 
structure and objectives of NEAFC. In Section 2, some principles of cooperative 
and noncooperative management of staddling fish stocks are discussed.  Section 
3 gives a summary of managed stocks, their status, management measures, and 
implementation. Section 4 gives the performance criteria recently developed by 
NEAFC and report the main results. A discussion of the effectiveness of NEAFC is 
given in Section 5.  
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) was established, in its 
current form, in 1980 by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries, and entered into force in 1982. This Convention 
replaced the original North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 1959, which had 
replaced the 1946 Convention for the Regulation of Meshes and Fishing Nets and 
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the Size Limits of Fish. The modern rebirth of NEAFC is a result of the withdrawal 
of the European Community Member States as individual members of the 1963 
organisation, and the general introduction in 1977 of 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones [2].  
 
There are currently five contracting parties: The European Union (EU), Denmark 
(on behalf of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway, and the 
Russian Federation. All of these are coastal states2.  Flag states that have a real 
interest in fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic can be accorded a Co-operating 
non-Contracting Party (CNCP) status. This will allow them to authorise vessels 
flying their flag to operate in the NEAFC area, and they agree to enforce NEAFC's 
measures [3] There are at present five CNCPs: Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Japan 
and New Zealand. 
 
NEAFC consists of a Commission; three permanent committees: Permanent 
Committee on Control and Enforcement (PECCOE), Finance and Administration 
Committee (FAO), and Permanent Committee on Management and Science 
(PECMAS); four working groups:  Working Group on the Future of NEAFC, 
Working Group on Deep-Sea Species, Working Group on Blue Whiting, Advisory 
Group on Data Communications; and a Secretariat based in London  [4]. 
 
The main objectives of NEAFC are to provide a forum for consultation and 
exchange of information on the state of fisheries resources in the Northeast 
Atlantic and on related management policies to ensure the conservation and 
optimal utilisation of such resources, and to set conservation measures in waters 
outside national jurisdiction [5].  
 
                                                 
2 It should be mentioned that whether a country is a coastal state or a distant water fishing 
nation (DWFN) may vary with the fishery.  Russia is, for example, a coastal state when it comes 
to the Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery, but a DWFN in the blue whiting fishery, as this 
stock does not appear within the Russian EEZ. 
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NEAFC acts as a forum for consultation and exchange of information on the state 
of fishery resources in the Convention Area and on management policies, 
including examination of the overall effect of such policies on the fishery 
resources [6]. There is no internal scientific body since scientific advice is 
provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea —ICES, on 
the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding [6]. The Advisory Committee on 
Fisheries Management (ACFM) of ICES, on request, supplies NEAFC with 
scientific advice and, on this basis, NEAFC establishes conservation and 
management measures. Secretariat services were formerly provided by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in the UK, but since 1998 
there has been an independent Secretariat based in London [7] (IGIFL). 
 
The area of competence is shown in Figure 1. The Convention area is located in 
the Northeast Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, east of a line south of Cape Farewell 
(the southern tip of Greenland) at 42º W, north of a line to the southern tip of 
Spain at 36º N, and west of a line touching the western tip of Novya Semlya at 
51º E. A subset of the Convention area, consisting of three high seas areas, 
represent the NEAFC Regulatory Area: the Reykjanes Ridge, extending to the 
Azores; the “Banana Hole" of the Norwegian Sea (between the mainland and Jan 
Mayen); and the Barents Sea "Loophole". NEAFC does not set quotas or any 
other regulations in the “Loophole” (this is done by Norway and Russia), while it 
does in other areas, provided the members agree.  Moreover, it must be 
mentioned that NEAFC does not have any own powers to enforce its decisions. 
 
2.  THE MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS3 
According to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), highly migratory fish 
stocks and straddling fish stocks are to be managed by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs), consisting of relevant coastal states and 
                                                 
3
 This section draws heavily on Bjørndal and Munro [1]. 
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Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) with a “real” interest in the fishery.  This 
Agreement has now acquired the status of international law, although in principle 
it is binding only for the signatories.  Over time it may, however, acquire the 
status of international customary law and thereby become binding also for non-
signatories. 
 
Highly migratory stocks are represented by tunas and tuna like fish.  Straddling 
fish stocks is a term for all fishery resources other than anadromous and highly 
migratory fish stocks, which are to be found both within the EEZ(s) and the 
adjacent high seas, and that are exploited by coastal states and DWFNs.  
According to this definition, NEAFC is concerned with the management of 
straddling fish stocks, but not with highly migratory fish stocks. 
 
Non-cooperative management of resources is likely to lead to overexploitation.  
Based on game theoretic analysis, some basic principles of cooperative 
management have been derived.  Given the ability of players to communicate, 
under the right circumstances a stable cooperative management regime may be 
established.  At least three conditions must be met for a cooperative agreement 
to be preferred to competitive exploitation.  First, the solution must be Pareto 
optimal.  Thus, if one country is to gain more, it can only be at the expense of 
others.  Second, payoff from cooperation must be at least as great as under non-
cooperation, i.e., everybody must gain from cooperating.  Third, the solution 
must be time consistent or resilient. 
 
If side payments are introduced, the scope for bargaining increases.  Side 
payments may be introduced with a two fold purpose:  First, to enhance the 
scope for bargaining.  Second, to enhance the flexibility and the resilience of the 
cooperative arrangement. 
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The U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement serves as a framework for cooperative 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.  Nevertheless, its 
future is still uncertain. 
 
According to the UNFSA, a RFMO is to be open to all states having a “real” 
interest in the fishery encompassed by the RFMO; this includes coastal states 
and “relevant” DWFNs.  Would-be new members can only be excluded on 
grounds of non-cooperation.   
 
                   Cooperative management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks will likely 
be more difficult than cooperative management of «shared» fish stocks.  The key 
reason for this is that members of an RFMO may change over time.  Under the 
terms of the UN Fish Stock Agreement, would-be new members cannot be 
barred from a RFMO unless they refuse to abide by the RFMO management 
regime. 
 
Economic analysis of the management of high seas fisheries shows that truly 
open RFMOs will have little chance of success and result in overexploitaton.  The 
key problem is that of new members.4  It is not clear how potential new entrants 
can be excluded from a fishery.  If the only barrier prospective new members 
face is that they agree to abide by the RFMO management regime, it is possible 
that one or more initial or “charter” members of the RFMO will estimate that the 
net benefits of cooperation will be less than those of non-cooperation. 
 
Economic analysis suggests that resolution of the new member problem may call 
for granting “charter” members of a RFMO de facto property rights to the relevant 
resources.  Possible solutions to the problem may be that a new country may join 
only if an established country leaves, a waiting period for new entrants is 
                                                 
4
 In some instances, interlopers, flying flags of convenience, also represent a serious problem, 
but this will not be discussed further here. 
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introduced, or fees are imposed on new entrants.  Some of these issues depend 
critically on a legal interpretation of the UN Fish Stock Agreement.  
 
As is well known, many of the world fish stocks are seriously depleted [8]. This 
applies to straddling stocks as well.  Therefore, many RFMOs will be faced with 
the task of rebuilding stocks.  To the degree this is successful, the incentives for 
new countries to enter the fishery increase.  Pintassilgo [9] analysed the case of 
Atlantic bluefin tuna and found conditions under which an existing member of an 
RFMO would find it profitable to break away from a cooperative agreement.   
 
If RFMOs lead to successful cooperative resource management, relevant high 
seas adjacent to EEZ will become high seas in name only and the stock will be 
managed as a shared stock.   
 
In the following sections, we will discuss how some of these principles apply to 
the fishery resources managed by NEAFC. 
 
3.  RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
NEAFC covers all fishery resources of the Northeast Atlantic, except marine 
mammals, sedentary species and, insofar as they are dealt with by other 
international agreements, highly migratory5 species and anadromous stocks. The 
four main fisheries in the Convention Area are Norwegian spring spawning 
(Atlanto–Scandian) herring, mackerel, blue whiting, and pelagic redfish [10]. In 
2005 about 3.3 million tonnes, or 31 %, of the total North East Atlantic catch 
was taken in these fisheries [10] of which about 1 million tonnes is taken in the 
Regulatory Area, cf. Section 1 [11]. 
 
                                                 
5
 Atlantic Bluefin Tuna is managed by the ICCAT (see [12]). 
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The catches of the three pelagic species herring, blue whiting, and mackerel in 
2005 had a landed value of approximately 9,117 million Norwegian kroner (or $ 
681 million) from the Convention Area and 1,566 million Norwegian kroner (or $ 
236 million) from the Regulatory Area [11].  These species are mostly fished by 
large mid-water trawl and purse seine vessels. Blue whiting is mainly reduced 
into fish meal and fish oil. Traditionally, herring and mackerel were also used for 
this purpose, but today they are mostly used for direct human consumption. 
 
NEAFC is empowered to recommend a wide variety of conservation and 
management measures [5]. They include [7]: 
 
(a) the regulation of fishing gear and appliances, including the size of mesh of 
fishing nets. 
 
(b) the regulation of the size limits of fish that may be retained on board 
vessels, or landed or exposed or offered for sale. 
 
(c) the establishment of closed seasons and of closed areas. 
 
(d) the improvement and increase of fishery resources, which may include 
artificial propagation, the transplantation of organisms and the 
transplantation of young. 
 
(e) the establishment of total allowable catches and their allocation to 
Contracting Parties. 
 
(f) the regulation of the amount of fishing effort and its allocation to 
Contracting Parties.  
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Current (2007) measures in place include [10]: 
 
(a) TACs for blue whiting, mackerel, herring, pelagic redfish; 
 
(b) Mesh size restriction and maximum catch limit for pelagic redfish in the 
Irminger Sea; 
 
(c) Ban on gill nets in deep water (greater than 200 m depth): 
 
(d) Closure of areas where coldwater corals are affected by fishing activities: 
 
(e) Effort limit for deep sea species: 
 
(f) Prohibition of bottom trawling and use of static gear in the seamounts and 
other vulnerable deep sea habitats. 
 
 
Enforcement  
Although NEAFC became operational in 1982, it did not start to function 
properly until the mid-1990s when the Contracting Parties agreed to regulate 
the fisheries for several straddling stocks [13]. Following the 1995 U.N. Fish 
Stocks Agreement, NEAFC has made a number of changes to adapt to the 
enhanced role of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.  
 
In 1998, NEAFC adopted a recommendation on a Scheme of Control and 
Enforcement in Respect of Fishing Vessels Fishing in Areas Beyond the Limits 
of National Fisheries Jurisdiction in the Convention Area (hereafter called “the 
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Scheme”). The Scheme was entered into force on 1st July 1999, and the 
current Scheme was entered into force on 1st May 2007. The Scheme lays 
down obligations for Contracting Parties regarding the control measures, 
monitoring of fisheries, arrangements for inspections at sea and the follow-up 
of infringements, and the inspection of non-Contracting Party vessels in port 
[14, 15](. Contracting Parties (CPs) are required to implement a Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS), and all vessels fishing outside EEZs require VMS 
since January 2000 [14]. Contracting Parties are also required to notify the 
Secretariat of vessels authorised to fish in international waters and report 
catches taken.  
 
In 1999, NEAFC also implemented the Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-
Contracting Party vessels, and it was amended in 2003 in order to take actions 
against Non-Contracting Parties engaged in illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Regulatory Area.  Furthermore, in 2005, a 
new Port State control on landings and transshipment was adopted. These 
controls entered into force on May 1st 2007 [10].  
 
As can be seen, NEAFC has introduced a number of schemes and controls, 
some of which have come into force quite recently. Nevertheless, it must be 
stressed that enforcement of all these regulations is the responsibility of the 
flag states. 
 
Status of the key stocks and management 
 
Pelagic Redfish 
Redfish (Sebastes mentella) is a deep-sea species which occurs inside the EEZs 
of Iceland and Greenland and in the Regulatory Areas of NEAFC and the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO).  “Pelagic” redfish are bottom 
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dwelling at depths of several hundred metres, however, they experience a 
diurnal migration from bottom to top and back again. For this reason, they may 
be harvested with mid-water trawls as well as bottom trawls.  The pelagic fishery 
for redfish takes place in the Irminger Sea with deep water trawl starting in April 
and continuing until late autumn. Fleets from all the Contracting Parties 
participate with large factory vessels with on-board processing facilities 
 
The fisheries for redfish started in 1982 by Russian trawlers, and the total 
catches in the Irminger Sea increased from 60,600 tonnes in 1982 to 105,000 
tonnes in 1986 [7] . Since 1987, the total landings decreased to a minimum of 
28,000 tonnes in 1991, mainly due to effort reduction. Since 1989, the number 
of countries participating in the fishery gradually increased. Total catches have 
also increased after the 1991 minimum and reached a historical high of 180,000 
t in 1996 (Table 1). In addition to the increase in the numbers of participants, 
the fleet started targeting redfish deeper, at 600–800 m [16]. Since 2000, the 
NEAFC Redfish Working Group’s estimate of the catch has been between 74,000 
and 161,000 tonnes, highest in 2003 (Table 1). This is probably an 
underestimate due to incomplete reporting of catches [17].  
 
During the past decade, Germany, Iceland, and Russia have been the major 
participating nations in the fishery, and the Faeroe Islands, Norway, and 
Greenland have also participated for many years [16]. According to the NEAFC 
official catch statistics, Russia and Iceland are the two major fishing nations.  
Combined they accounted for almost 80 percent of total catch in 2005, with 
Russia accounting for 52 percent and Iceland 26 percent. The annual landing in 
the Convention Area and NEAFC Regulatory Area in 2004 were reported to be 
approximately 113,000 tonnes and 73,000 tonnes, respectively [11].  
 
The fishery has been regulated through total allowable catches (TACs) set by 
NEAFC since 1996 [16] and technical measures such as minimum mesh size in 
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the trawls which is set at 100 mm. In 2006, NEAFC recommended that the 
catches in the pelagic redfish fishery in the Irminger Sea and adjacent waters in 
2007 shall not exceed 46,000 tonnes. 
 
 
Because scientific views about stock boundaries have changed recently, and 
disagreements over the different components of the stock and their exploitation 
have hampered agreement on management, no management objective has been 
agreed upon and no harvest control rules are in effect [11]. ICES had difficulties 
in obtaining catch estimates from the various fleets and there are indications that 
unreported catches are substantial [18].  
Although the IUU catches have not been quantified, two studies using a satellite 
imagery vessel detection system (VDS) to detect fishing vessels in the NEAFC 
regulated redfish fishery have shown that 27 - 33 percent more vessels were 
found in the area than were reporting to NEAFC between June 2002 and June 
2003 [17] Furthermore, landings data were missing from some ICES member 
countries [11].  
 
As mentioned, NEAFC began managing this stock in 1996 but accepted ICES 
advice only in 2003 and 2004. Catches have exceeded TACs in a number of years 
(Table 2) due to IUU fishing as well as the use of the Objection Procedure within 
NEAFC [11]. The Objection Procedure allows Contracting Parties to object to a 
recommendation, which becomes non-binding on the Contracting Party that has 
objected. If more than three Contracting Parties have objected to a 
recommendation, it will become non-binding on any Contracting Party [19].  
 
It is significant that there remains no consensus within ICES regarding stock 
structure. Currently, it is assumed that all fisheries are exploiting one population. 
However, the stock structure is inconclusive as the data available supports a 
number of different hypotheses from one stock, to different multi-stock systems. 
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ICES has advised that management should aim at preventing a disproportional 
exploitation rate of the fish in the two distinct fishing areas in order to prevent 
local depletion, but  to date this has not been done [11]. 
 
ICES has advised that the stock is vulnerable to over-exploitation.  ICES has 
indicated that the available information is inadequate to evaluate spawning stock 
biomass or fishing mortality relative to risk, so the state of the stock is unknown. 
The acoustic trawl survey June-July 2005 indicated that the stock size is low 
compared to that in the early 1990s but stock size has not shown any clear 
trends since 1999. The 2005 survey also indicates a substantial decrease in the 
abundance of fish larger than 40 cm. Table 2 shows the TACs agreed by the 
NEAFC, ICES advice and ACFM catch.  
 
Commercial CPUE series were previously used to determine stock size. Because 
the fishery targets pelagic schooling fish and fishing technology improved over 
time, increasing CPUEs do not always reflect the stock status. Yet a decreasing 
CPUE is likely to indicate a decreasing stock. Overall CPUEs declined between 
1994 and 1997 and have since fluctuated without a clear trend. However, all 
nations reported a decline in CPUE in 2004 (Figure 2).  Nevertheless, as Schrank 
and Pontecorvo [20] have pointed out, although a decreasing CPUE is likely to 
indicate a declining stock, there are important examples where a constant or 
even increasing CPUE occurs in the presence of a declining stock.  Thus, it is 
unclear what evidence is provided by the information in Figure 2.  
 
Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring  
The Norwegian spring spawning herring (Clupea harengus) or Atlanto-Scandian 
herring is a straddling stock that is distributed throughout large parts of the 
North-East Atlantic during its lifespan [21, 22]. The fishery is important for 
employment and revenue in many countries, including Norway, which records 
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the largest annual harvest, Iceland, Russia, Faeroe Islands, and some other 
member countries of the EU [23]. The fishery for Norwegian spring spawning 
herring follows the migration of the stock closely as it moves from the wintering 
and spawning grounds along the Norwegian coast to the summer feeding 
grounds in the Faeroese, Icelandic, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, and international areas 
[18].  
 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, Norwegian spring-spawning herring was a major 
commercial species and the stock was subjected to heavy exploitation [23]. The 
annual harvest peaked at 2 million tonnes in 1966, but by this time the stock was 
in serious decline and by the late 1960s the mature stock was almost depleted 
due to overfishing [21]. A large increase in fishing effort, new technology, and 
environmental changes contributed to the collapse of this stock by the late 1960s 
[18]. Due to the moratorium that was put in place to allow an increase in the 
spawning stock, the stock recovered by the late 1980s/early 1990s (Figure 3).  
 
Until 1994, the fishery was almost entirely confined to Norwegian coastal waters, 
but during the summer of 1994 there were also catches in the offshore areas of 
the Norwegian Sea for the first time in 26 years, due to the herring resuming its 
traditional migratory pattern [18]. In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Fishery 
Management (ACFM) of the ICES recommended a total allowable catch (TAC) of 
513,000 tonnes, but participating countries ignored the recommendation and the 
collective harvest of Norway, Russia, Iceland, Faeroe Island and the EU exceeded 
900,000 tonnes, almost twice the quantity recommended by ACFM [21]. The 
fishery expanded further the subsequent year (Figure 3).  
 
In 1996, the EU, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, and Russia agreed to 
implement a long-term management plan for Norwegian spring-spawning herring. 
The management plan was part of the international agreement on total quota 
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setting and sharing of the quota during the years 1997–2002 [22]. The Parties 
agreed to maintain a level of Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) greater than the 
critical level (Blim) of 2 500 000 t, and to restrict their fishing on the basis of a 
TAC consistent with a fishing mortality rate of less than 0.125 for appropriate 
age groups as defined by ICES for the year 2001 and subsequent years.  
 
In addition, there were a number of bilateral agreements between the countries 
involved.  Fishermen from other countries were allowed to harvest part of their 
quota in the Norwegian EEZ and the control zone around Jan Mayen, which is 
under Norwegian jurisdiction, thus enabling them to harvest at a time of year 
when the herring contain more fat and thus are more valuable.  Moreover, 
fishermen from other countries are allowed to land their harvests in Norway, 
which would tend to reduce transportation distances and thus increase the prices 
they would fetch.  This policy would also benefit the Norwegian fish processing 
industry.  Juvenile herring grow up in the Russian EEZ.  To compensate Russia 
for not harvesting juvenile herring, which would imply growth overfishing, Russia 
is given a quota in the Norwegian EEZ. 
 
The management plans and coastal state agreements were suspended for four 
years between 2003 and 2006 due to the disagreement over allocation of quotas.  
In this period, the bilateral agreements between Norway and other countries 
were also suspended, except for the one between Norway and Russia regarding 
juvenile herring.   
 
In January 2007 however, the EU, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and the 
Russian Federation signed an agreement on the management of this stock for 
2007. The Parties agreed on a TAC for the Norwegian Spring-Spawning herring 
of 1.518 million tonnes in 2008. The allocation of the quotas is as follows: 
European Community 98,822 tonnes; Faeroe Islands 78,329 tonnes; Iceland 
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220,262 tonnes; Norway 925,980 tonnes, and Russian Federation 194,607 
tonnes.  
 
The agreed TAC, compared to the actual catch and ICES advice over time, are 
shown in Table 3. The main catches in 2004 were taken by Norway (477,000 
tonnes), Russia (116,000 tonnes), Iceland (101,000 tonnes), and Faeroe Islands 
(43,000 tonnes) and lesser catches were taken by EU fleets (55,000 tonnes) [18]. 
In 2005, the total landings in the Convention Area and in the Regulatory Area 
were approximately 1,254,000 tonnes, and 195,000 tonnes, respectively [11].    
 
The Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery provides a very interesting 
example with regard to the management of straddling fish stocks.  As mentioned, 
when the stock was in a depressed state, it stayed fully in the Norwegian EEZ.    
[23] analysed cooperative and competitive management of this stock, including 
the question whether it might be profitable for Norway to break away from 
cooperation and maintain a lower stock that would remain under Norwegian 
control.  This was not found to be profitable.  The analysis showed that 
cooperation would give greater benefits than competition to all players, and that, 
under no alternative considered, would it benefit a player to break away from 
cooperation in the long run. 
 
The period leading up to cooperation was interesting.  In 1995, the players set 
TACs unilaterally, obviously on the basis that the ability to harvest higher quotas 
might give higher shares in a cooperative solution.  Nevertheless, as catches 
exceeded the TAC recommended by ICES by 80%, this clearly shows the 
potential danger of competitive harvesting if a situation like this should persist.  
In 1996, Norway, Russia, Iceland and the Faeroese Islands reached an 
agreement, but without the involvement of the EU.  The EU was fishing at full 
capacity, presumably with the intention of increasing its share once a full 
cooperative agreement was reached. 
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In the years 1997-2002, the partners agreed on the setting of the annual TAC 
and the shares for each country.  The reason the agreement broke down in 2003 
was because of Norwegian demands for a higher share of the TAC.  These claims 
were based on the zonal attachment principle or the concept of ”biomass by 
time'' within the zones (stock size within a zone multiplied with the duration of 
the stay, see Monstad [24]),  It turned out that the herring spent more time in 
the Norwegian EEZ than expected when the first agreement was reached and, 
based on this principle, Norway laid claim to a greater share of the quota.  This 
showed that the original cooperative agreement was not time consistent.  In the 
end, only minor adjustments to the quota shares were made.  Although Norway’s 
quota demands were not met, Norway preferred a cooperative agreement to a 
non-cooperative one. 
 
ICES classifies the current status of the stock as having full reproductive capacity 
and being harvested sustainably.  
 
Blue Whiting 
Blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) is a pelagic gadoid that is widely 
distributed in the eastern part of the North Atlantic [22]. The highest 
concentrations are found along the edge of the continental shelf in areas west of 
the British Isles and on the Rockall Bank plateau where it occurs in large schools 
at depths ranging between 300 and 600 metres. It is also present in almost all 
other management areas between the Barents Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar 
and west to the Irminger Sea [22].  
 
The blue whiting fishery is the largest fishery in the North East Atlantic.  Its total 
catch was in excess of 2 million tonnes in 2006. According to the official catch 
statistics of NEAFC, Norway accounted for 37 percent of the total catch in 2005, 
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followed by the EU (19%), Russia (17%), Iceland (13%), and Faeroe Islands 
(13%).  Annual catches by country for 1995-2006 are given in Table 4 and have 
shown a very substantial increase over time.  The landings of blue whiting in the 
Convention Area in 2004 were 2,407,000 tonnes, of which 721,000 tonnes were 
in the Regulatory Area, respectively6.  
 
 
Multi-national fishing for blue whiting started at the end of the 1970s, with 
participation mainly from the former Soviet Union (Russia) and Norway (Standal, 
2006). In most of the 1980s and 1990s, the catches were rather stable, however, 
the catches increased rapidly since 1998 (Figure 4), and a new catch record was 
set almost every year, with catches over 2 million tonnes in 2003-2006.  
 
The fishery has been regulated by a TAC system since 1994. NEAFC agreed to 
follow the advice from Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) 
regarding an annual total catch quota, but for many years the coastal nations set 
their own quota, the sum of which far exceeded the recommendation from ICES 
[35]. In 2003, for instance, catches of blue whiting reached a record high of 
almost 2.4 million tonnes (Figure 4), whereas advised catch limit from ICES was 
around 600,000 tonnes [25].  
 
There is a Coastal State management plan in place that is applied by NEAFC, 
however, ICES has not yet evaluated this plan in relation to the precautionary 
approach [11]. The exceptional recruitment and concurrent underestimations of 
stock size by ICES, and uncertainty regarding the status of the stock, have 
resulted in coastal states being unwilling to reach agreements on management 
[11] or, at any rate, to follow recommendations by fisheries biologists who for a 
number of years underestimated the stock. 
                                                 
6
 These data are taken from [11].  There is a discrepancy between the catch figure of 2,407,000 
tonnes and that of 2,419,000 tonnes in Table 4, with FAO Fishstat as source.  It has been 
impossible to ascertain the reason for this discrepancy. 
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Based on the most recent estimates of SSB and fishing mortality, ICES classifies 
the stock as having full reproductive capacity, but being harvested unsustainably. 
ICES has advised that immediate management action should be taken, as the 
current fishing effort is much above what the stock can sustain if it returns to a 
lower recruitment regime.   ICES recommends that biomass, according to the 
precautionary principle (Bpa) is set at 2.250 million tonnes and that the 
corresponding fishing mortality (Fpa) is set at 0.32 [25, 26]. 
 
The history leading up to the 2005 agreement is most interesting.  Apart from 
the Russian Federation and Norway, which developed the fishery, the blue 
whiting was mainly fished by vessels from the Faeroe Islands and countries from 
the European Union.  Only minor fishing was carried out by Icelandic vessels 
until the mid-1990s (Table 4), when a new Icelandic fishery was initiated by a 
fleet of powerful vessels [28]. As a consequence, the Icelandic catches of blue 
whiting increased rapidly, reaching 501,000 tonnes in 2003. 
 
As the landings of blue whiting grew to significant quantities, it became clear 
that an international agreement was needed on how to share this resource 
among the nations involved and to avoid overexploitation.  NEAFC organised a 
series of meetings to this end, including workshops, discussions and negotiations. 
However, after two years of such meetings in the early 1990s, when the matter 
was thoroughly dealt with, no agreement was reached on how to share the Total 
Allowable Catch, i.e., the quota recommended by NEAFC on the basis of advice 
from the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) [24]. 
 
The process was put aside until 1998, when NEAFC set up a Working Group to 
deal with the matter and present suggestions for a solution. The Working Group 
consisted of representatives from the coastal states, i.e., states that have the 
blue whiting stock occurring within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). These 
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are the EU, Norway, Iceland, Faeroe Islands and Greenland (formally 
represented by Denmark). The Russian Federation is also included, although not 
regarded as a coastal state by the others, but it is a major participant in the blue 
whiting fisheries. 
 
A great amount of effort was devoted to this process. All the available relevant 
data were analysed and used as a basis for discussion and negotiations. In spite 
of this and the urgent need for management measures to regulate the blue 
whiting fisheries, an agreement was not reached until late 2005. 
 
The various countries involved have presented alternative ways to show the 
biological zonal attachment of blue whiting. Some countries use the zonal 
attachment principle or the concept of ”biomass by time'' within the zones (stock 
size within a zone multiplied with the duration of the stay), while others 
exclusively employ the catch statistics from the zone as the basic concept.  A 
combination of these two methods is also used, and in some cases other factors 
such as economic dependency on the fishery were also considered. The relevant 
parties presented demands for their own quota share along with what they 
thought the others' shares should be, and the sum of each nation's claim 
amounted to almost 200 % of a possible TAC. 
 
To allow for fishing blue whiting in the waters of other countries, the states have 
negotiated bilateral quotas within the various zones.  Due to the lack of agreed 
sharing of the quota, the negotiations did not consider the recommended TAC. 
In addition, each country allowed for unlimited landings from its own as well as 
from international waters. As a result of this the actual harvest was in fact in 
some years almost three times more than recommended by ICES. 
 
A multilateral agreement included an agreement to reduce fishing mortality to 
sustainable levels within three years. The Contracting Parties established an 
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allowable catch limitation of 1.25 million tonnes [29] of blue whiting for 2008. 
TAC allocations are as follows: European Community 350,000 tonnes; Faero 
Islands 300,000 tonnes; Norway 296,000 tonnes, and Iceland 202,000 tonnes.  
 
In 16th December 2005, after six years of negotiatons, the coastal states of the 
EU, Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, 
starting in 2006, includes a long run management strategy that implies annual 
reductions in the landings until the management goals are reached [30].  This 
arrangement  provided for catches in 2006 of 2 million tonnes [31]  allocated as 
follows: EU 30.5 %, Faeroe Islands 26.125 %, Norway 25.745 % and Iceland 
17.63 %. Russia will be accommodated by transfers from some of the coastal 
states and additional catches in the NEAFC area [32].  In 2006, Russian catches 
represented 16.3 % of total catches (Table 4). 
 
For a lucid and up to date game theoretic analysis of the blue whiting fishery, 
see Ekerhovd [33]. 
 
An interesting aspect of this agreement is how the coastal states’ fishermen’s 
organisations were instrumental in preparing the ground for the agreement. 
During the summer of 2005, prior to the coastal state agreement, various 
fishermen’s organisations from the European Union, Iceland, and Norway 
negotiated and signed an agreement, similar to the one signed by officials from 
the coastal states later that year [34]. 
 
The virtually unregulated blue whiting fishery prior to 2006 appears to have been 
a very attractive strategy for further economic expansion for agents who 
otherwise fish for herring and mackerel within a system where the harvest 
quantity is strongly quota regulated and access to the resources is strictly limited 
[35]. There has been a dramatic development in the pelagic fishing fleets from 
the late 1970s when vessels and equipment were not suitable for the blue 
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whiting fishery.  During the past 10-12 years, there has been a considerable 
modernisation of the fleet of combined purse seiners/blue whiting trawlers with 
high financial investments and, therefore, a great need for increased catch 
income.  Vessels that were licensed to fish blue whiting faced few restrictions in 
this fishery, both with respect to quantity and time [33], and were able to gain 
maximum use of their catch capacity. Within the framework of licensed-regulated 
fishing where only a limited numbers of participants can take part in the 
otherwise unregulated blue whiting fishery, we see that modern technology has 
a prominent position where development is accelerated by financial motives for 
largest possible profit. 
 
For many years the coastal states were not able to reach an agreement on the 
management of the blue whiting stock. One possible reason for this is pressure 
from the national fishermen organisations. Then, suddenly, when the fishermen 
agree, the coastal states follow. There are probably several reasons for this 
change in mode. One is that that the fishermen knew that the stock could not 
sustain such a high fishing mortality much longer without collapsing. Secondly, 
the catches were already decreasing compared to just a couple of years earlier, 
and this encouraged the vessel owners to find a solution as to how a TAC should 
be divided while there still was something to share. Another factor that was 
instrumental for the Norwegian vessel owners’ willingness to negotiate was that 
the extraordinary blue whiting fishery in Norwegian waters  during summer and 
autumn had not been the success they had hoped it to be, and therefore did not 
back up Norway’s claim to 37% of TAC. 
 
Northeast Atlantic Mackerel 
ICES currently uses the term “North East Atlantic Mackerel” to define the 
mackerel present in the area extending from ICES Division IXa in the south to 
Division IIa in the north, including mackerel in the North Sea and Division IIIa.  
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The stock is historically divided into three components, with the North Sea 
component considered to be over-fished since the late 1970s, and the western 
component contributing the vast majority of biomass and catch to the stock [36]. 
For management purposes, they are treated as one stock because the stocks mix 
at times when they are jointly harvested [37].  Therefore, fishing effort is in the 
main not directed at any one of the three separate components, but at a single 
combined stock.  It has not been possible to calculate the total catch taken from 
the North Sea stock component separately because of the low stock size and low 
catches taken from Divisions IVbc, but it has been assumed to be 10,000 tonnes 
for a number of years [36]. 
 
Total catches peaked in 1979 at 843,000 tonnes, and more recently in 1993 and 
1994 around 820 000 tonnes (Figure 5). They have remained at about 650,000 
tonnes since 1995, but catches declined to around 433,000 tonnes in 2005 
(Figure 5). According to the official catch statistics, in 2005 about 60 percent of 
the catches were taken by member countries of EU, followed by Norway (28%), 
Russia (9%), Faeroe Islands (2%), and Iceland (less than 0.1%). The landings of 
the mackerel Scomber scombrus in the Convention Area and in the Regulatory 
Area in 2004 were reported to be 527,000 tonnes, and 41,000 tonnes, 
respectively [11].  
 
The fishery is regulated by an internationally agreed TAC. Moreover a number of 
management measures are in place to protect the North Sea component of the 
stock that is considered depleted, and to protect juvenile mackerel. The total 
TAC set for 2008 is 385,366 tonnes [38]. Despite the attempts to control 
allowable catches, the landings have exceeded the annual TACs in most years 
(see Table 6), sometimes by a considerable amount. 
 
ICES classifies the stock as being harvested unsustainably. Spawning stock 
biomass (SSB) has declined since 1992 but has shown an increasing trend in 
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recent years  (Figure 5). Misreporting of catches is also a serious problem.  The 
ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine 
and Anchovy (WGMHSA) has found substantial levels of unaccounted mortality, 
and these unaccounted removals have been estimated to be more than 60% of 
the reported catch [36]. The Coastal States, the EU, the Faeroe Islands and 
Norway, have adopted a series of control measures regarding the weighing and 
inspection of landings for mackerel that should help to resolve this problem.  
 
As of early September 2008, Icelandic pelagic fishing companies have caught 
108,000 tonnes of mackerel this year, which is a substantial increase from 2007 
when a little over 36,000 tonnes were caught [39]  This appears to be due to 
changes in the distribution pattern of mackerel which now partly migrate into the 
Icelandic EEZ.  While Iceland had no quota and hardly any catches in the past, 
this is likely to change in the future.  It also means that the mackerel “game” has 
changed, with essentially the appearance of a new coastal state.  All that can be 
said at this point is that it is uncertain what impact this development may have 
on the management of mackerel. 
 
Deep Sea Species 
ICES uses the term deepwater (or deep sea) fisheries at depths greater than 400 
m. The deep water in the ICES area covers the deep parts of ICES Subareas I, II, 
III, V-X, XII, and XIV. In some parts of the northeast Atlantic where the 
continental shelf is narrow, such as off Portugal, there have been traditional 
fisheries for many years, for example for black scabbardfish (Aphanopus carbo) 
and red (or blackspot) seabream (Pagellus bogaraveo) [18] Other traditional 
species are ling, blue ling, and tusk. Before the 1980s, with the exception of a 
fishery for species such as roundnose grenadier (Coryphaenoides rupestris), 
there was little interest from the fishing industry in exploiting stocks in 
international waters, but since the 1980s dwindling resources on the continental 
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shelves of the North Atlantic have encouraged the development of fisheries in 
deeper waters [18].  
 
Fisheries for species such as anglerfish and Greenland halibut have extended into 
deeper waters, and new fisheries have developed to target the new deepwater 
species. Species such as the argentine or greater silver smelt (Argentina silus) 
and roundnose grenadier (Coryphaenoides rupestris), which were previously 
bycatch species, have been targeted within the ICES area for the last two 
decades. Orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) has been a target species 
since the early 1990s.  
 
Expansion of the deep-sea fisheries has been rapid, and at a greater pace than 
scientific information has become available. It is believed that most species and 
stocks are not being fished sustainably, and ICES has recommended immediate 
reductions in the fisheries unless they can be shown to be sustainable. It is also 
believed that within the ICES area some species/stocks have been depleted 
before appropriate management measures have been implemented.  
 
The Contracting Parties agreed to freeze effort in 2003 and 2004, and then 
reduce it by 30% for 2005 and 2006. There are no long term management 
objectives, nor are there any long term management plans in place. Questions as 
to appropriate management remain. 
 
4.  THE PERFORMANCE OF NEAFC 
The need for strengthening the roles of Regional Fisheries Organisations 
(RFMOs) has been highlighted in recent years at international meetings such as 
the Committee on Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO/COFI). In November 2005 NEAFC decided to undertake its 
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own performance review.  The purpose of the review was to provide for a 
systematic check of the performance of the organisation and its consistency with 
the NEAFC Convention, the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) and 
other relevant international agreements and instruments [11]. 
 
A six member mixed review Panel was appointed, of which three members of the 
Panel were selected with guidance from the international institutions and three 
were selected from inside NEAFC. The Panel’s task was to identify achievements 
and highlight areas where improvement could still be made [11].  
 
According to best practise for external reviews, all members of the panel should 
be external. Why NEAFC deviated from this, and included three members from 
inside the organisation, is unknown. 
 
The Panel based its work on the obligations set out in relevant international 
instruments, in particular UNFSA, and the generally agreed approaches for 
effective fisheries management as outlined in the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fishing, the supporting guidelines, as well as other relevant technical 
reports. This involved looking for evidence of robust systems as well as effective 
processes and governance when evaluating each of the review criteria.  
 
Review criteria are given in Table 7. They assessed the performance of NEAFC 
against the objectives set out in the Article 4 of the 1982 Convention. The review 
criteria are divided into five categories (the left column), and they are further 
subdivided into 17 groups (middle column). The right column describes the 
detailed criteria for each group.   
 
The results of the Review Panel were detailed in its 2006 Report, and the key 
issues addressed by the Panel are summarised below.  
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Although the review report does not provide a clear cut answer to overall 
performance of the NEAFC as it lacks quantitative evaluation results, overall the 
Panel acknowledged progress in a number of areas, e.g. conservation measures 
already taken by NEAFC.  Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that although 
conservation measures may have been taken, what really matters is how 
effective they are.  The really critical questions are, how are regulations enforced, 
and how effectively?  The Panel does not address these issues in a satisfactory 
way. 
 
The Panel also identifies some areas where improvement can be made. These 
include: 
• Knowledge regarding pelagic redfish as well as deep-sea species is lacking. 
Sustainable management of pelagic redfish continues to be problematic 
and resolution is seen as a high priority for NEAFC and its Contracting 
Parties; 
• The lack of focus and information available on economic and social 
benefits; 
• Regarding monitoring and control, more attention could be paid to quality 
control, e.g. entry and exit messages could be cross-checked and 
messages concerning transhipments should be systematically checked to 
verify that there is a match between donor and receiver vessels' reports. 
Moreover, there is scope for improvement in the coordination of the 
allocation and deployment of inspection resources; 
• The measures on Port State control must be clarified and reinforced; 
• The effectiveness of the measures to combat IUU fishing could be 
strengthened through the reciprocal recognition of IUU lists between 
NAFO and NEAFC which are scheduled to come into effect from 2007; 
• While NEAFC has a decision-making role in terms of the management of 
resources, in practice decisions on a number of stocks are made outside 
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NEAFC. This leaves NEAFC with a limited residual role in decision-making 
in respect of the management of stocks. 
 
While some of these points are technical and fairly easy to rectify, the 
implications of others are uncertain.  The Panel points out that lack of 
information about economic variables is an issue (a situation that can be rectified, 
with relative ease).  It fails, however, to say how the recommendations of NEAFC 
might change if this information were available.   
 
Similarly, the Panel notes that NEAFC has “a limited residual role in decision 
making of (some) stocks”, but fails to suggest or identify properly what this role 
should be. 
 
The 27th session of the FAO COFI meeting which took place in March 2007 also 
acknowledged that although the evidence of strong performance in specific areas 
of operation such as the monitoring and enforcement schemes was observed, 
the status of the main fish stocks in the Convention area is at a critical point and 
unless effective action is taken promptly, there is a strong possibility that their 
future sustainable use will be compromised [40].  
 
Since the NEAFC Performance Review was completed in October 2006, there 
have been a number of important developments in NEAFC which have addressed 
most of the major concerns identified by the Panel [41]. These include: 
• NEAFC has adopted new Port State Control measures as a part of the 
existing NEAFC Control and Enforcement Scheme. The new measures 
entered into force on 1 May 2007. This new Scheme will effectively close 
Contracting Party ports to landings of frozen fish which have not been 
certified by the Flag State of the vessel intending to land. 
• NEAFC has joined forces with NAFO to create a pan-North Atlantic list of 
IUU vessels. The two RFMOs have decided that vessels on their respective 
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lists of IUU vessels are transferred from the list of one organisation to the 
list of the other.  Depending on the transgression, measures against IUU 
vessels include denial of port facilities and fishing rights in the EEZs of the 
Contracting Parties.  
• In November 2006 NEAFC agreed that bottom trawling and fishing with 
static gear shall be prohibited in three more areas in the Regulatory Area 
to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems, in addition to the five areas 
closed since 2005. 
• Criteria and objectives for using closed areas as a tool to minimise the 
ecological impacts of fisheries on marine habitats and biodiversity will be 
more closely examined in NEAFC’s Permanent Committee on Management 
and Science. 
 
Nevertheless, although these measures may be important in certain regards, it is 
uncertain what impact they will have on improved management and enforcement. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Since the UNFSA was concluded in 1995, NEAFC has made a number of positive 
changes, in particular, in combating IUU fishing and improving monitoring and 
enforcement through the adoption of the Scheme of Control and Enforcement, 
the Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party vessels, and a port 
State control on landings and transshipment.  
 
However, as pointed out by the FAO COFI meeting and by its review Panel, 
major stocks are overfished or fished unsustainably and there is a need to 
improve resource management. Out of five major fisheries, only the Norwegian 
spring spawning herring stock is considered sustainable. The herring stock 
appears to be robust despite the fact that the coastal state agreement broke 
down for several years with the consequence that harvest exceeded the 
recommended TAC for some years.  Attempts to reach an international 
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agreement on exploitation of blue whiting have also failed a number of years, 
and the landings of Northeast Atlantic mackerel have exceeded the annual TACs 
for many years.  For the pelagic redfish fishery, no management objective has 
been agreed on due to the disagreements over the structure of stock 
components. Whether this is a substantial argument or a nebulous one is 
probably difficult to tell. 
 
These observations indicate that there is a clear need to strengthen the roles of 
NEAFC in terms of decision-making, and to reduce catches to the level 
recommended by ICES.  For this to happen, it must be seen to be in the interest 
of the members of the organisation.  Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that 
the stock situation for redfish is uncertain, while ICES on several occasions have 
been grossly mistaken in its advice regarding blue whiting.  
 
Moreover, due to the lack of information on economic and social benefits, the 
review Panel was unable to make an assessment of the performance of NEAFC in 
terms of meeting the Convention’s objective of optimal utilisation [11]. The Panel 
considers it unlikely that such benefits are being optimised given that many of 
the fisheries in the Convention Area are industrial level fisheries being fished, in 
practice, under open access conditions, and consequently a portion of the 
economic rents available from these fisheries is most probably being dissipated 
at the expense of optimal economic or social outcomes [11]. It must be pointed 
out, however, that this situation can be changed if it is seen to be in the interest 
of the countries involved to do so. 
 
There is some evidence of rent dissipation. For instance, Kennedy estimated that 
optimal harvest levels of Northeast Atlantic Mackerel, where joint rent between 
participating countries is maximised, to be about the half of the current level [37].   
On the other hand, substantial – albeit not maximum – rents are made in the 
Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery [42]. 
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The time consistency or resilience of agreements also appears to be an 
important consideration, as climate change can impact on the distribution pattern 
for several stocks in question.  The breakdown of the coastal agreement for 
Norwegian spring spawning herring due to changes in distribution was discussed 
in Section 3; see also Hannesson, Herrick and Barange [43].  Possible 
consequences of climate change for the blue whiting agreement are analysed in 
a recent paper by Ekerhovd [44].  Whether climate change is the cause of 
migration of mackerel to the Icelandic EEZ is not yet known. 
 
Although the Panel suggested that NEAFC take steps to develop an annual 
fisheries status report which encompasses not just biological factors for the fish 
stocks concerned but social, environmental and economic assessments as well 
[11], there have not been any actions taken as of today. RMFOs, including 
NEAFC could improve their negotiating power by addressing socio-economic 
benefits from optimal management of fisheries resources, and provide incentives 
for coalition formation.  How this could or should happen, is left unexplained.    
 
Some of the conditions underlying cooperative management of a fishery resource 
were discussed in Section 2.  In the final instance it is the interests of the agents 
in the fishery, acting on their own or in coalition with others, that will determine 
how a fishery is managed and how management is enforced.  Underlying the 
management regime, however, is the setting of suitable TACs and their 
distribution among the participants in the fishery.  This places a formidable 
responsibility on the Contracting Parties to achieve sustainable harvesting of very 
valuable fish stocks in the North Atlantic.  Based on recent history, there is 
considerable scope for improvement. 
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Figure 1: The NEAFC Regulatory and Convention Area.   
Source: NEAFC website [10]. 
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Figure 2: CPUE for the Pelagic S. Mentella Fishery.  
Source: Taken from [18]. 
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Figure 3: Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Landings of Norwegian Spring-
spawning Herring. 1980-2004.  
Source: Taken from [18]. 
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Figure 4: Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Landings of Blue whiting 1981-
2004.  Million Tonnes.  
Source: Taken from [18]. 
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Spawning Stock Biomass and Catches of Mackerel.  1980-
2005. (Million tonnes)
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Figure 5: Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Catches (including discards) of 
Northeast Atlantic Mackerel 1980-2005. Million tonnes 
Source: Taken from [18]. 
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Table 1: Catches of Pelagic Redfish in the Irminger Sea and Adjacent Waters. 
1990-2006. Tonnes a 
 
Year  
Total 
catches 
1990 31,901 
1991 27,608 
1992 65,962 
1993 115,835 
1994 148,689 
1995 175,842 
1996 180,322 
1997 122,825 
1998 116,968 
1999 109,665 
2000 126,313 
2001 128,818 
2002 146,334 
2003 160,984 
2004 125,905 
2005 73,715 
2006 82,910 
a Due to the lack of area reporting for some countries, the share in Subareas XII and XIV is only 
approximate in the most recent years. 
Source: Sata from [45]. 
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Table 2: Agreed TAC vs. Catch of Pelagic Redfish S. Mentalla. ’000 tonnes. 
 
Year ICES Advice 
Agreed 
TAC a,b  
ACFM 
Catch 
1987 No assessment  91 
1988 No assessment  91 
1989 TAC  39 
1990 TAC  32 
1991 TAC  27 
1992 Preference for no major expansion of the fishery  66 
1993 TAC  116 
1994 TAC  149 
1995 TAC  176 
1996 No specific advice 153 180 
1997 No specific advice 153-158 123 
1998 TAC not over recent (1993-1996) levels of 150 000 t 153 117 
1999 
TAC to be reduced from recent (1993-1996) levels of 150 
000 t 153 110 
2000 
TAC set lower than recent (1997-1998) catches of 120 
000 t 120 126 
2001 TAC less than 75% of catch 1997-1999 95 129 
2002 
TAC less than 75% of catch 1997-1999 Revised to be 
below current catch levels 
Not 
agreed 
NEAFC 135 
2003 TAC not exceed current catch levels 
proposal 
(95) 151 
2004 TAC not exceed current catch levels 119 124 
2005 Limit catch to 41 kt 120  
2006 Catch less than 41 kt 80  
a) Set by NEAFC. b) Preliminary.  
Source: data from [18]. 
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Table 3: Agreed TAC vs. Catch of Norwegian Spring-spawning Herring. ‘000 
tonnes. 
 
Year ICES Advice 
Agreed 
TAC 
ACFM 
Catch 
1987 TAC 115 127 
1988 TAC 120 135 
1989 TAC 100 104 
1990 TAC 80 86 
1991 No fishing from a biological point of view 76 85 
1992 No fishing from a biological point of view 98 104 
1993 No increase in F 200 232 
1994 
Gradual increase in F towards F0.1; TAC 
suggested 450 479 
1995 No increase in F Nonea 906 
1996 Keep SSB above 2.5 million t Noneb 1 217 
1997 Keep SSB above 2.5 million t 1 500 1 420 
1998 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 1 300 1 223 
1999 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 1 300 1 235 
2000 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 1 250 1 207 
2001 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 850 770 
2002 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 850 809 
2003 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 711c) 773 
2004 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 825c) 794 
2005 Do not exceed the harvest control rule 1.000c)  
2006 Do not exceed the harvest control rule   
Source: data from [18]. 
a Autonomous TACs totaling 900 000 t.  
b Autonomous TACs totaling 1 425 000 t were set by April 1996. 
c There was no agreement on the TAC, the number is the sum of autonomous quotas from the 
individual Parties.  
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Table 4. Catches of Blue Whiting by Country in the Northeast Atlantic, 1995-2006.  
Tonnes. 
 
Country 1995a 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Norway 261,362 356,054 348,268 570,665 534,570 553,478 
Russian 
Federation 93,824 87,310 118,656 130,042 182,637 241,905 
Faeroe 
Islands 25,936 21,483 28,773 71,217 105,106 152,687 
Iceland 369 513 10,480 68,514 160,424 259,157 
EU 143,762 147,946 185,068 312,238 314,927 238,561 
Total 526,380 613,306 691,246 
1,152,67
7 
1,297,66
5 
1,445,78
8 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Norway 573,686 557,684 851,396 958,768 738,599 642,453 
Russian 
Federation 315,586 298,367 360,160 346,762 332,240 329,400 
Faeroe 
Islands 258,334 204,524 326,593 316,868 267,447 320,592 
Iceland 365,101 286,381 501,494 422,078 265,889 314,755 
EU 281,247 210,732 333,485 374,815 455,394 410,050 
Total 
1,793,95
4 
1,557,68
8 
2,373,12
8 
2,419,29
1 
2,059,56
9 
2,017,25
0 
a Japanese catch of 1,127 tonnes are included in 1995 total. 
Source: Data from [46]. 
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Table 5. ICES’s Management Advice on TAC for Blue Whiting: the Expected 
Landings (Based on the Recommendations), TAC Agreed upon by the NEAFC 
Members,  and Actual landings.  ‘000 Tonnes.  
 
Year ICES recommendations Expected 
landings 
TAC Actual 
landings 
1994 Precautionary TAC (northern 
component); no recommendations on 
the southern component of the stock 
485 650a 459 
1995 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 518 650a 579 
1996 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 500 650a 646 
1997 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 540 650a 672 
1998 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 650 650 1,125 
1999 Landings > 650,000 t may  not be 
sustainable in the long run 
650 650 1,256 
2000 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 800 650 1,412 
2001 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 628 650 1,780 
2002 Rebuilding plan 0  1,560 
2003 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 600  2,321 
2004 Achieve 50% probability that F will be 
less than Fpa 
925  2,378 
2005 Achieve 50% probability that F will be 
less than Fpa 
1,075   
2006 F = F management plan 1,500   
2007   1,700  
Source: Report of the Northern Pelagic and Blue Whiting Fisheries Working Group, 25 August 1 
September 2005 (ICES CM 2006/ACFM:05). Cited in: [18].  TAC for 2007 was taken from [22]. 
a NEAFC proposal for NEAFC regions 1 and 2. 
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Table 6:   Agreed TAC vs. catch of Northeast Atlantic Mackerel. ‘000 tonnes. 
 
Year ICES Advice 
Total 
Agreed 
TAC c 
Official 
landings 
Discards 
and 
Slippinga 
 
ACFM 
catchb,d 
1987 Given by stock component 442 589 11 655 
1988 Given by stock component 610 621 36 680 
1989 Given by stock component 532 507 7 590 
1990 Given by stock component 562 574 16 628 
1991 Given by stock component 612 599 31 668 
1992 Given by stock component 707 723 25 760 
1993 Given by stock component 767 778 18 825 
1994 Given by stock component 837 792 5 821 
1995 Given by stock component 645 660 8 756 
1996 Significant reduction in F 452 493 11 564 
1997 Significant reduction in F 470 434 19 570 
1998 F between 0.15 and 0.2 549 647 8 667 
1999 F of 0.15 consistent with PA 562 595 n/a 616 
2000 F=0.17: Fpa 612 579 2 675 
2001 F=0.17: Fpa 670 620 1 687 
2002 F=0.17: Fpa 683 688 24 727 
2003 F=0.17: Fpa 583 580 9 617 
2004 F=0.17: Fpa 532 559 11 611 
2005 F=0.15 to 0.20 422    
2006 F=0.15 to 0.20     
Source: data from [18]. 
a Data on discards and slipping from ony two fleets. 
 b Landings and discards from IIa, IIIa, IV, Vb, VI, VII, VIII, and IXa.  
c All areas except some catches in international waters in II.  
d Catches updated in 2003 with revisions from SGDRAMA in 2002.  
n/a=not available. Tonnes. 
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Table 7.   Performance Review Criteria 
1. 
Conservation 
and 
management 
of fisheries 
resources  
Knowledge about the 
status of marine 
living resources  
Status of major fish stocks in relation 
to maximum sustainable yield and 
other relevant biological standards. 
Trends in status of stocks. Status of 
species belonging to the same 
ecosystems as, or associated with, or 
dependent upon, the major target 
stocks  
 Quality and provision 
of scientific advice 
Extent to which NEAFC receives advice 
in accordance with Article 14 of the 
NEAFC Convention and the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between ICES and NEAFC 
 Data collection and 
sharing 
Extent to which Contracting Parties, 
individually or through NEAFC, collect 
and share, in a timely manner, 
complete and accurate data concerning 
fishing activities 
 Adoption of 
conservation and 
management 
measures, including 
measures adopted at 
Coastal State level 
Extent to which NEAFC has adopted 
measures based on the best scientific 
evidence available and used strategies 
designed to ensure the promotion of 
the long-term conservation and 
optimum utilisation of fishery resources  
Extent to which NEAFC provides 
sustainable  
economic, environmental and social 
benefits  
Extent to which NEAFC has taken due 
account of the need to conserve marine 
biological diversity and minimise harmful 
impacts of fisheries on living marine 
resources and marine ecosystems 
 Compatibility of 
management 
measures 
Extent to which measures have been 
adopted as set out in Article 7 of 
UNFSA 
 Fishing allocations Extent to which NEAFC successfully 
allocates fishing 
2. 
Monitoring, 
control and 
Flag States duties Extent to which Contracting Parties are 
fulfilling the duties as Flag States under 
the NEAFC Scheme (UNFSA Article 18 
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enforcement and the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement) 
 Monitoring, 
surveillance and 
control activities 
Extent to which Contracting Parties 
implement the relevant parts of the 
NEAFC Scheme of Control and 
Enforcement and the non-Contracting 
Party Scheme 
 Port State measures Extent to which Contracting Parties 
implement port State obligations under 
the non-Contracting Parties Scheme 
and UNFSA Article 23 
 Other enforcement-
related issues, 
including follow up on 
infringements  
Extent to which Contracting Parties are 
following up infringements to both 
Schemes.  
Management measures by which they 
are bound 
3. Decision 
making and 
dispute 
settlement 
procedures 
 Extent to which NEAFC has established 
adequate decision making procedures 
and mechanisms for solving possible 
disputes 
4. Co-
operation 
Transparency Extent to which NEAFC is operating in 
accordance with the transparency 
provisions of Article 12 of UNFA 
 Participatory rights of 
newcomers 
Extent to which NEAFC is determining 
participatory rights of new members in 
accordance with Article 11 of UNFA 
 Relationship to 
cooperating non- 
Contracting Parties 
Extent to which NEAFC grants 
cooperative non-Contracting Party 
status in accordance with the non-
Contracting Party Scheme 
 Relationship to other 
non-Contracting 
Parties 
Extent of fishing activity by vessels of 
non-Contracting Parties, that are not 
cooperating with NEAFC and measures 
to deter such activity 
5. NEAFC in 
a regional 
and 
international 
context 
Co-operation with 
other RFMO/As 
Including co-operation in the network 
of Regional Fishery Body Secretariats 
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 Co-operation with 
other regional 
organisations 
Including the OSPAR Commission for 
the Protection of the Marine 
Environment in the North East Atlantic 
Source: Data from [11]. 
 
